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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
Vol. 53, No. 4, November 2012
THE COEVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM
MONARCHY TO DEMOCRACY∗
BY FALI HUANG1
Singapore Management University, Singapore
This article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to
oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development. As the predominant source of wealth
evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital, the relative economic and hence coercive power of
land owners, capitalists, and workers shifts accordingly, inducing the transition of the political system where political
power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally toworkers.A smooth transition throughpolitical compromise
facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
The main storyline of human history may be driven by the dynamic interactions between
cooperative economic activities leading to greater aggregate wealth and political conflicts over
its distribution. This article attempts to formalize this idea in a simple model of long-run
economic and political development: As the main source of growth shifts from land to physical
capital and then to human capital, the relative economic and hence coercive power of landlords,
capitalists, and workers shifts accordingly, inducing the transition of the political system from
monarchy to oligarchy (of landowners and capitalists) andfinally to democracywith full suffrage.
Every new political regime, by extending political power to the owners of the new form of
capital and thus increasing their future economic gains from investment, speeds up economic
progress. In other words, a smooth expansion of political power from the owners of land to the
owners of capital and then to the owners of labor facilitates a smooth transition in investment,
allowing for efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in
human capital. Failure to expand political power to support expanding investment would lead
to the retarding of economic development. These results are broadly consistent with historical
evidence in Western Europe, especially England and France, where the full time line in the
model has been realized through autonomous transitions.2
The sequence of the economic development path is mainly determined in the model by the
distinct technical features of production factors: Land is endowed by nature and difficult to
create or destroy; physical capital, in contrast, has to be produced endogenously by investment;
∗ Manuscript received January 2010; revised October 2011.
1 The author thanks Jan Eeckhout, the anonymous referees, Oded Galor, Omer Moav, Nils-Petter Lagerlof, and
seminar participants at University of Hong Kong, SMU, City University of Hong Kong, Lessons from History Inter-
national Conference at Hong Kong, North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society at Minneapolis,
DEGIT-XI at Jerusalem, AEA Annual Meetings at Chicago, Australian Public Choice Conference at Melbourne,
ISNIE at Stanford University, and IEA World Congress at Beijing for helpful comments. This research is supported
by SMU research grant 04-C208-SMU-034. Please address correspondence to: Fali Huang, School of Economics,
Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Phone: +65-68280859. Fax: +65-68280833.
E-mail: flhuang@smu.edu.sg.
2 The model abstracts from international interactions such as colonization and thus may not be directly applicable to
latecomers in development that were colonized or conquered. As Olson (1993) pointed out, although “there are a fair
number of democracies, there have not been many spontaneous and entirely autonomous transitions from autocracy
to democracy.” England and France are arguably the main exceptions.
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the raw labor is endowed by nature, but human capital beyond this basic level has to be acquired
through endogenous investment. The exogenous endowment of land and raw labor makes it
beneficial to invest in physical capital first when savings become available, although the ever
increasing stock of physical capital will eventually trigger human capital investment when the
return to it becomes large enough (Galor and Moav, 2004, 2006).
The division of outputs among production factor owners is determined by the political system,
where the ruler may exploit ruled agents through taxes and confiscation. The establishment
and transition of political regimes is mainly driven by the assumption of might is right, that
is, the political right of any group has to be obtained and secured by their coercive might,
which is determined by the joint incomes and coordination effectiveness of its members.3 This
chain of economic strength, coercive might, and political right is the engine that pulls the
coevolution train of dynamic economic and political development across different historical
stages.4 Specifically, the transition of political regime is modeled as an equilibrium outcome in
a political game between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group, where the latter may
choose either to obey the ruler or revolt, and then in response to revolt, the ruler may choose
either to compromise or to repress. A smooth transition to a new political regime occurs under
compromise, in which the ruler extends political power to the challenging group; otherwise an
openfight breaks out, whichmay in a probabilisticmanner lead to either repression or revolution
depending on the balance of coercive power. In the equilibrium, the challenging group revolts
only when its coercive power becomes large enough, and compromise is more likely to occur
when the cost of fighting is higher, when the stake of political power (as represented by the net
tax rate) is smaller, and when the incumbent’s repressive apparatus is weaker.
The model economy starts from the agricultural era when there is no capital investment. The
initial political regime is monarchy, where the exogenous and fixed supply of land makes it pos-
sible for an individual to capture and hold enough land to possess dominant coercive power over
others and become the monarch.5 The balance of economic and coercive power would remain
stable under monarchy for a long time, until the endogenous capital accumulation becomes an
important source of economic growth. In sharp contrast to land or other natural resources, the
new form of wealth, namely, physical capital, cannot be easily centralized or controlled by the
monarch through coercion, because its ultimate source is inherently dispersed among individual
capitalists and difficult to capture by force.6 As the stock of physical capital increases over time,
it would eventually replace the relatively fixed land as the predominant source of wealth, and
enable its owners to collectively acquire enough coercive power to obtain political rights and
protect their capital returns. As the same logic applies to human capital beyond raw labor,
workers as the owners of human capital will also gain political rights when their coercive power
becomes sufficiently large. Thus, the endogenous accumulation of physical capital and human
capital is the fundamental driving force underlying the democratization process from monar-
chy to oligarchy and then to democracy, along which the exploitative political rent gradually
dissipates until all factor owners share political power and earn competitive market returns.
3 This is in line with North’s (1981, pp. 21–22) theory of state, in which the key to understanding the state involves the
potential use of violence to gain control over resources: “The contract theory assumes an equal distribution of violence
potential among the principals. The predatory theory assumes an unequal distribution.”
4 Note that the coercive might is similar to the de facto power used by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a), although
political power has some similarity to the de jure power. From this perspective, an innovation of this article is modeling
the dynamic links between the de facto and de jure power.
5 Such a technical feature of land also applies to natural resources, which seems to be the ultimate cause for the
natural resource curse (Ross, 1999; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Lagerlof and Tangeras, 2008).
6 Factories and machines may be confiscated by others, but the most important assets of capitalists in capital ac-
cumulation, such as their entrepreneurial skills, technical know-how, and business networks, are usually intangible
and difficult to capture by coercion. Nor are these special talents of capitalists readily accessible to everyone in the
population. Even at the present time, how to become a successful entrepreneur still eludes most people. The standard
human capital, such as the skills to read, write, and calculate, in comparison, can be systematically acquired through
education.
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The model has several useful implications concerning the relationship between economic
growth and political development. First, the more fundamental force underlying democratiza-
tion is not the income level per se, but the changing factor composition (where the predominant
factor for economic growth shifts from land to physical capital and finally to human capital),
because the latter determines the changing economic and coercive power of different factor
owners. In other words, the production factor composition is the common element that affects
both the income level and the nature of the political regime. This accounts for why in both his-
tory and current times, most democracies have industrialized economies where human capital
is the dominant source of growth, although in countries with natural resources as the main form
of wealth, authoritarian political regimes are more likely to occur.7
The second implication is that political transition often makes a breakthrough in a short
period of time, although the groundwork, by means of economic development, usually takes
a long time. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Acemoglu et al. (2008) as well as
Boix and Stokes (2003). Third, economic growth is a necessary but insufficient condition toward
political development, as the ultimate political outcome is affected by the balance of coercive
power, the cost of fighting, and the probability of winning during the crucial transitional periods,
which may depend on geopolitical, ideological, and other ultra-economic elements.
This article proceeds as follows. Themain contributions of this article to the related literature
are discussed in the next section. The basic elements of the political economy model are intro-
duced in Section 3, and the analysis of the model is in Section 4. Related historical evidence is
collected in Section 5, and some concluding remarks are offered in the final section. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.8
2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELATED LITERATURE
This article belongs to a broad literature connecting growth, development, and institutions in a
long-term perspective.9 Its primary contribution is using a unified political economy framework
to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and, finally, to democracy
with full suffrage in the context of dynamic economic development. This framework appears
to be very useful in uniting scattered results and reconciling conflicting views in a systematic
way. To a certain extent, the model suggests that the history of human society is, in essence,
an integrated democratization process in which each country, though following unique routes,
moves within the same broad historical trend shaped by the changing predominance of land,
physical capital, and human capital in the economy.
Owing to its immense importance and complexity, the democratization process has been
a major subject in comparative history. In a landmark study, Moore (1966, p. 429) found that
“getting rid of agriculture as amajor social activity is one prerequisite for successful democracy”
and robust capitalist development is crucial in achieving this end.Moore’s conclusion on the role
of the bourgeoisie as the primary agent of democracy, although widely shared by the orthodox
Marxist and liberal social science view, is challenged byRueschemeyer et al. (1992, p. 270). They,
instead, conclude that “a key actor in the development of full democracy almost everywhere” is
not capitalists but the organized working class, and the widely believed association of capitalist
development with democracy is mainly because it strengthens the working class.
These seemingly conflicting conclusions are, however, consistent with and neatly reconciled
by the main results of this article: The focus of Moore is on the first political transition from
monarchy to oligarchy (or parliamentary democracy), whereas that of Rueschemeyer et al. is
mainly on the second political transition from oligarchy to full democracy. Distinguishing these
7 For evidence of such correlations see Lipset (1959), Huber et al. (1993), Burkart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Londregan
and Poole (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Ross (1999), Boix (2003), and Epstein et al. (2006), among others,
in the large modernization literature.
8 The robustness of this article’s main results is checked against alternative modeling choices in the working paper
version.
9 See Bertocchi (2006b) for a survey of related literature.
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two transitional stages helps to clarify the crucial role of capitalists in breaking the absolute
power of monarchy and initiating the parliamentary democracy at an earlier historical occasion,
and the role of the working class, strengthened during the industrialization process, in pushing
for further franchise expansion at a later time. To be sure, these two democratization stages
inherently share some common features, which are also obvious in the model; distinguishing
them analytically, however, seems to bring more insights than does ignoring their critical dif-
ferences in the historical timing and economic bases (of physical capital and human capital,
respectively).
The formal analysis of democratization started only recently in economics, with relatively
few studies focusing on the first political transition from monarchy to oligarchy. Olson (1993)
argues that, compared with anarchy, a tax-collecting monarch brings substantial benefits to
the people and “permits a considerable development of civilization.” North and Weingast
(1989) discuss the emergence of parliamentary democracy in the seventeenth century England
and the corresponding improvement of property rights security after the Glorious Revolution.
DeLong andShleifer (1993) provide evidencewhich shows that absolutist princes, in comparison
to representative governments, slowed down economic growth, especially in cities. Bertocchi
(2006a) models the evolution of the land inheritance system from primogeniture to partition
that when landed estates are replaced by capital as the primary source of wealth. These results
are consistent with findings in this article, which shows that the large inequality of land under
monarchy is necessary to maintain a stable political rule and to facilitate capital investment,
although the growing strength of capitalists will eventually replace monarchy by oligarchy that
promotes industrial and commercial interests.
There are a number of studies on how the voting franchise is further expanded from oligarchy
to full suffrage. In a seminal study by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), franchise expansion is
used by the ruling elites to mitigate the revolutionary threat from workers. Following the
same theme of conflict resolution, Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) find that the elites may want
to co-opt a subset of the challenging group. In contrast, an alternative rationale for suffrage
extension suggests that the elites may do it voluntarily in their own best interests (Lee, 2003;
Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Jack and Lagunoff, 2006). Both views find support in historical
evidence, either in different countries or at different times, which prompts further research to
characterize conditions that give rise to distinct transition paths (Justman and Gradstein, 1999;
Boix, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005; Llavador and Oxoby, 2005; Cervellati et al., 2006;
Gradstein, 2007; Cervellati et al., 2008). This article contributes to this stream of literature by
establishing a unified analytical framework where the same fundamental forces can account for
the gradual suffrage extension from absolute monarchy to oligarchy by landlords and capitalists
and, finally, to full democracy; it shows that this general historical trend of political power being
shared among more people over time is ultimately driven by dynamic economic development
in which the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and later to
human capital.
The long-term growth literature10 typically abstracts from the political conflict that is the focus
of the democratization literature. The economic development path in this article builds on the
important insight of Galor and Moav (2006) that the complementarity between physical and
human capital would eventually eliminate the class distinction between capitalists and workers.
In a related study, Galor and Moav (2004) examine the endogenous replacement of physical
capital accumulation by human capital investment as a prime engine of economic growth in
the transition from industrial sectors to modern growth based on services, although Galor
and Weil (2000) as well as Hansen and Prescott (2002) emphasize the effects of technological
progress inmoving the economy from agricultural to industrial productionmethods. This article
contributes to this literature by formally modeling the evolving composition of main production
factors during the economic growth process and highlighting the important role of political
transitions in shaping distinct economic development paths across countries.
10 See Galor (2005) for a survey of the unified growth theory.
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Another strand of related literature studies the effects of institutions on long-run growth.
North (1981) proposes a dynamic framework of political economy and substantiates it by
rewriting Western history in its light. He recognizes not only the influence of technology ad-
vancement on institutions, especially property rights, but also the effects of political institutions
on future technological and economic development. In some sense, this article is an attempt to
formalize this dynamic framework in a simple model; it may thus shed light on current debates
on whether technology or institutions are more important for long-run growth. Acemoglu et al.
(2005) argue that institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run growth, whereass Glaeser
et al. (2004) demonstrate that the level of human capital is more fundamental than institutions.
In fact, both claims can be true in the chain of dynamic interactions between the economic
fundamentals and political institutions shown in this article, depending on which specific seg-
ment is chosen for investigation. Among countries with similar institutional backgrounds, the
initial gap in economic fundamentals may become the ultimate cause of their later divergence
as institutions may evolve endogenously.11 On the other hand, between countries with similar
economic fundamentals, different institutions caused by exogenous factors may account for
their later economic development gaps.12
To the extent that the cooperative and conflicting sides of human interactions are treated
simultaneously, this article is connected with Hirshleifer (1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), and
Grossman (2002) among others. Although the article’s analysis of the political conflicts among
factor owners is similar to the Marxist approach of class struggles (Marx and Engels, 1848),
there is a major difference: The class conflicts are embedded here in the cooperative context of
economic activities and eventually resolved under democracy where political rents disappear
and each factor earns its competitive market returns. This result echoes Polanyi’s (1944) view
that a competitive market economy was brought forth together with political democracy for the
first time in human history by the industrialization process. He observed that both harmony and
conflicts are inherent in the economy, and they often lead to each other in a dynamic world. On
this point, this article further suggests that the cooperative side dominates historical progress in
the long run, although the conflicting side may change historical paths for some time and often
in a stagnant direction.
3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL
3.1. The Economy. There are overlapping generations in the economy with a fixed popula-
tion size.13 Each individual lives for two periods, accumulating human capital in childhood and
participating in production at adulthood.
3.1.1. Preferences. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are represented by a log-
linear utility function uti = (1− β) log cti + β log (z+ bti), where cti is the adulthood consumption
of individual i in generation t, bti is his bequest for offspring,14 β ∈ (0, 1) indicates the relative
11 Consistent with results in this article, Galor et al. (2009) find that the inequality of land ownership, although
beneficial in earlier development, can be a major hurdle in the emergence of human capital promoting institutions,
and hence negatively affect future economic performance. Similar views are also expressed by Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997) and Rajan and Zingales (2009).
12 In this article, the same economy with different fighting costs during the political transition periods may generate
distinct political outcomes, which will affect the economic development path afterward. This is similar in spirit to the
findings of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) that the political security of the incumbent elites may determine whether
they would block technological and institutional innovations that potentially undermine their incumbency advantages.
In a related work along this line, Rodrik et al. (2004) find that conventional measures of geography have a strong
indirect effect on incomes by influencing the quality of institutions.
13 In an earlier version of the paper the population size was set to follow the broad demographic trends in history as
in Hansen and Prescott (2002); the main results were the same.
14 This bequest motive from the “joy of giving” is commonly adopted in the recent literature on income distribution
and growth. See Altonji et al. (1997) for related empirical evidence. This particular utility function is also used in Galor
and Moav (2006) and Fishman and Simhon (2002), among others.
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weight of bequest in utility, and z> 0 is a constant. The budget constraint is cti + bti ≤ Iti, where
Iti is individual i’s income at adulthood.
As a result of utility maximization, the individual’s optimal bequest is bti = max {β(Iti − Z),
0}, where Z ≡ z(1 − β)/β. That is, only when an individual’s income is higher than a certain
level Z, would there be any resources left as bequest;15 this is a reasonable result given that the
model economy starts from the agricultural era where many people live at the subsistence level







max{β(Iti − Z), 0}.(1)
3.1.2. Final output production. In every period the economy produces a single homoge-
neous good that can be used for consumption and investment. The production function at
time t is
Yt = At(L+ Kt)1−αHαt .
The knowledge stock At grows at an exogenous speed g > 0 so that At+1 = At(1 + g), which is
the ultimate growth engine.16 The quantity of land L is fixed over time, although the stocks of
physical capital Kt and human capital Ht depreciate fully after one period, which corresponds
to one’s adulthood (about 20–30 years). This production function is adopted only to simplify the
exposition, as the main results are the same whether using a more general production function
that allows complementarity between land and physical capital or using a detailed two-sector
general equilibrium model, both of which are analyzed in the working paper version.
3.1.3. Endowment. The initial endowment of land L is exogenously distributed among Nl
landowners. There areNc identical capitalists who are endowed with skills to generate physical
capitalKt using final outputs.17 The majority areN workers each endowed only with raw labor.
The initial state of the model economy corresponds to a time when agriculture is the dominant
production method, the physical capital stock is zero, and people are not educated.
3.1.4. Production functions of physical and human capital. The aggregate physical capital
Kt ≡ Ncmkt is produced byNc identical capitalists, wheremkt denotes the amount of output used
in generating physical capital. With an education expenditure mht , an individual may acquire
human capital ht according to
ht = f (mht ),(2)
where f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0, and limmht →+∞f ′ = 0.We assume f (0)= 1 so that a worker is endowed with
a basic unit of human capital, namely, the raw labor, even without any education expenditure;
15 The implication that the rich save more is consistent with empirical evidence (Dynan et al., 2004). If a homothetic
utility function is used instead, individuals will leave positive bequests regardless of how low their incomes are, which
does not seem to be reasonable in the context of this article where the model starts from the agricultural period with
subsistence levels of incomes. And furthermore, it will not change the main results because the economic development
path is determined mainly by the distinct features of the three production factors.
16 In a more general setting, the knowledge stock should be allowed to increase in the aggregate physical or human
capital; this will speed up capital investment and thus political transitions, but will not change the main results. The
assumption of a slowly growing knowledge stock even when there is no human capital is also made by Galor and Weil
(2000) and Hansen and Prescott (2002). Note that the exogenous growth rate g, though positive, can be arbitrarily close
to zero in the model, which is not inconsistent with the almost zero growth rate found in the Malthusian era.
17 Alternatively, one may think of capitalists as emerging from either the landed class or workers; that is, with a
certain exogenous probability Nc/(Nl + N) an individual is endowed with physical capital production skills. Though it
is more realistic to allow families to change class, as long as such incidents are relatively few compared with those who
remain in the same class, the assumption of fixed class lines serves as a reasonable approximation.
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to acquire human capital above the basic level, however, a positive amount of output is needed.
And furthermore, f ′(0) = γ < +∞ holds so that the human capital production function has a
finite slope at zero investment.18
3.1.5. Capital investment. An individualmay invest his bequest in physical capital or human
capital for the next generation. There is no credit market for human capital investment, which
can only be financed by public education or by parental bequest. To simplify the exposition, the
option of private schooling is not considered in the model.19 The public education expenditure
Mht is financed through tax revenues by the ruler to maximize its own benefits, where an
endogenously determined tax rate τh∗t is imposed on parental bequests so that M
h
t = τh∗t Bt−1.20
Individuals then invest their disposable savings in the capital market, and thus the total amount
used in producing physical capital isMkt = (1 − τh∗t )Bt−1.
Note that only capitalists have the skills to produce physical capital; landowners and workers,
however, may supply their savings bt−1,i to capitalists through the capital market to gain a return
δ̂tbt−1,i, where δ̂t ≥ 0. Each capitalist borrows resources from the capital market at the rate δ̂t
to produce physical capital kt and then rent it to the final output producers to get a return rtkt,
where rt is the rental rate of physical capital. Because capitalists as a group act as a monopolist
in producing physical capital, and as the exact value of δ̂t is not important for the main results,
δ̂t = 0 is assumed in the basic model.21 So the aggregate physical capital is equal to
Kt = (1 − τh∗t )Bt−1.
The sequence of the economic development path is mainly determined by the distinct technical
features of these three factors of production, where land and raw labor are endowed by nature,
although physical capital and human capital have to be produced endogenously. The exact
timing of the economic development stages, however, is also affected by institutional elements
such as the political structure discussed below.
3.2. The Political Structure. The division of outputs among production factor owners is
determined by the political system, where the ruler may exploit ruled agents through taxes and
confiscation. The establishment and transition of political regimes are shaped by the balance of
political powers, whichmay experience fundamental changes during the economic development
process. Consistent with the horizon of economic decisions in the overlapping generationmodel,
the length of an individual’s adulthood, which corresponds to one period in the model, is also
used as the horizon for political decisions.22
18 The typically assumed Inada condition (i.e., γ is infinite) is designed to simplify the exposition by avoiding a corner
solution, but it is not necessarily a realistic assumption for human capital production given that individuals are already
endowed with a unit of human capital.
19 Although mass education by private financing is possible in principle (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2004), in history it
has not been the typical case due to the subsistence level of wages and the imperfection of credit markets (see Galor
and Moav, 2006, for more evidence).
20 Imposing tax on bequests is equivalent to directly taxing incomes beyond the threshold Z because bti =
max {β(Iti − Z), 0}.
21 The case for δ̂t = δ > 0 is formally analyzed in the working paper version. Note that the entrepreneurial skills
of capitalists are crucial and indispensable in transforming savings to physical capital, and thus capitalists get the
main proportion of capital returns although the capital market suppliers receive theirs as interest returns. This is in
line with recent endogenous growth models where capitalists run firms producing intermediate goods in monopolistic
competition (Acemoglu, 2008).
22 Allowing longer horizons may alter the timing but not the qualitative results of the transition process. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006b), for example, find similar results for the political transition problem in a more abstract setting
with infinite horizons. Due to the extremely long period (often in themagnitude of hundreds of years) themodel covers,
it is not realistic to assume that agents can take into consideration all of the future economic and political changes when
they make decisions. For example, Moore (1966, p. 30) observed that “it is unlikely that more than a very few people
had any but the haziest notions as to ... what kind of a society might lie over the horizon.” Moreover, most European
monarchies were insecure, which prevents kings from taking a long view (DeLong and Shleifer, 1993).
1348 HUANG
FIGURE 1
THE POLITICAL GAME BETWEEN CHALLENGING GROUP AND INCUMBENT RULER
3.2.1. Coercive capability. The coercive capability of a group of Nj individuals is






i=1 Iti of the group members indicates the overall economic strength of the
group, which can be transformed to coercive power through supply of weapons and soldiers,
for example. ψ(Nj, et) is the group’s organizing effectiveness, which increases with et, the
group-average capability to coordinate, but decreases with group sizeNj due to free-riding and
information problems; that is, ψ1 < 0 and ψ2 > 0. For simplicity, we assume et = ht for workers
and et = e > 1 for landlords and capitalists,23 where ψ(1, e) = 1 holds by normalization.
3.2.2. Political transition. The initial political regime is established based purely onmight
is right, where the dominant group becomes the first ruler and imposes tax on others. The
highest possible tax rate τ ∈ (0, 1) is determined by an individual’s ability to hide his income,
and the tax collecting cost is (1 − η) ∈ (0, 1) of the tax revenue. Note that this tax is purely
exploitative and represents the economic benefit of possessing political power.
The transition of political regimes follows the political game illustrated in Figure 1. In each
period, a challenging group may choose either to obey the current political order or to revolt. In
response to revolt, the incumbent ruler has two options: One is to repress the revolting group,
the other is to compromise.When compromise is proposed and accepted,24 the ruler will extend
political power to the challenging group so that no exploitative tax is imposed on their incomes,
and this will lead to a peaceful transition to a new and more democratic political regime.
When the ruler chooses to repress, the challenging group may either surrender immediately
so that the old regime continues as before or continue to revolt so that an open fight breaks out,
where the result of fighting is determined by the two fighting parties’ coercive capabilities as
given by (3). Let vCt ≡ ψCt ICt and vGt ≡ ψGt IGt denote the coercive capability of the challenging
group and the ruler, respectively, where ICt and I
G
t are their before-tax incomes. Then the
23 The skills of landlords and capitalists are exogenously given in this article; they are formally analyzed in Huang
(2012).
24 Because accepting compromise always leads to a higher payoff than other alternatives for the challenging group,
which is to be formally proved in Proposition 1, the game ends when compromise is chosen by the ruler in order to
simplify the exposition.
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The probability of the ruler winning the fight and preserving the current political regime with




1 + χ−1xt ≡ q(xt),
where χ > 1 indicates the effectiveness of the ruler’s repressive apparatus, which is also a form
of incumbency advantage as it increases the incumbent’s winning probability in the fight beyond
its coercive capability vGt . Note that q
′(xt) < 0 holds, implying that the ruler is less likely to win
when the challenging group’s relative coercive power is higher.25 When the ruler loses, which
happens with probability 1− q(xt), such revolution leads to a violent transition to a new political
regime where the challenging group becomes the new ruler imposing tax on others.
3.2.3. Equilibrium. Although the exact payoffs in the game are derived in the next sec-
tion, some general features of the game can be discussed here. Let IOt denote the before-tax
joint income of the neutral group, which is composed of all the other individuals outside the
challenging and ruling groups. Under the current political order, the challenging group has to
pay tax τICt , although the incumbent ruler receives a net tax revenue ητ(I
C
t + IOt ), and so their




t ) = ((1 − τ)ICt , IGt + ητICt + ητIOt ).
When compromise is achieved, the challenging group gains political power; this means it
stops paying the exploitative tax τICt , and in addition, it will share the total tax revenue ητI
O
t
with the ruler, where the sharing rule is based on its relative economic power. Specifically, their




tP) = (ICt + ητIOt I
C
t
ICt +IGt , I
G











θ > 1 indicates the fighting cost. Fighting is costly because it consumes resources and disturbs
routine production, and for simplicity, we assume that the loser has to pay the fighting cost.26
When the revolt succeeds, the challenging group gains political power although the incumbent




tV ) = (ICt + ητIGt + ητIOt , (1 − τ)IGt /θ).
The outcomes of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) are characterized in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. When xt ≤ x∗t (θ) holds, the current political order continues [((Not Revolt,








, ω0 = χ( 1τ − 1)(1 − 1θ ), and
x∗′t (θ) > 0.
When xt > x∗t (θ) holds, the challenging group revolts, and compromise is realized [((Revolt,
Revolt), Compromise) is the SPE] if θ ≥ θ∗t (η, τ, χ) is true, where




1 + χψGt /ψCt −1
1−IOt /Yt
) ,
otherwise an open fight occurs [((Revolt, Revolt), Repress) is the SPE], which leads to either
repression or revolution, where the probability of revolution increases in xt.
25 Because this property is also true for alternative contest functions (Besley and Persson, 2011), the main qualitative
results of political transition are robust.
26 As long as the loser has to bear a large proportion of the fighting cost, which is often the case because the winner
can always demand compensation, the results go through.
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FIGURE 2
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
This proposition says that the current political regime continues peacefully when the chal-
lenging group is still relatively weak (that is, when xt is smaller than the threshold x∗t (θ)); when
it becomes strong enough, however, the old political regime may not be able to sustain any
longer. The transition to a new political order can be either smooth or violent. When it is too
costly to engage in fighting (that is, when θ ≥ θ∗t (η, τ, χ)), compromise between the ruler and
the challenging group is the equilibrium outcome, where a smooth transition of political regime
is achieved by extending political power to the challenging group. In this case, the change of
coercive power (or de facto political power) is consolidated by the change of (de jure) political
power without interrupting economic development, which is the main focus of this article.
Such an ideal situation of smooth political transition, however, is not achievable in equilibrium
when it is not so costly to fight (that is, when θ < θ∗t (η, τ, χ)). In this case, the ruler and the
challenging group will engage in an open fight for political power. If the ruler wins, then the
old regime continues by repressing revolts; if the challenging group wins, revolution occurs that
leads to a violent transition to a new political regime. The fight is more likely to end up with
revolution when the challenging group is more powerful, which is not surprising.
Figure 2 illustrates these equilibrium outcomes in the space of the fighting cost θ and the
challenging group’s relative coercive power xt. Given that x∗t (θ) is increasing in θ, a stable
political regime with no revolt is more likely to continue in places where the coercive power of
the challenging group is still small or where it is more costly to fight. The fact that θ∗t (η, τ, χ) is
increasing in ητ and χ implies that compromise is more likely to arise when the stake of political
power (represented by the net tax rate ητ) or when the incumbent’s repressing capacity χ is
smaller. In other words, among countries with the same fighting cost θ, those with lower tax rates
and weaker repressive apparatus have a larger likelihood to reach political compromise.27
4. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT PATH
Until modern times, the peasant is an “object of history,” over which “historical changes pass
but which contributes nothing to the impetus of these changes” (Moore, 1966, p. 453). To be
consistent with such historical evidence, |ψ1| and ψ2 are assumed to be large enough so that
workers lack enough coercive might to gain political rights by themselves before human capital
investment starts, and they will not be invited to join any challenging group by other factor
owners. The underlying reason is that the large size and low coordination skills of workers may
reduce the coercive capability of any group including them.28
27 A reduced-form version of the political model without the game tree can also be used to derive the main results if
one is more interested in the economy side of development. For example, one can simply assume conditions similar to
the equilibrium results in Proposition 1 to hold exogenously. Detailed results are shown in the working paper version.
28 The exact conditions can be formally derived in all relevant cases, which are omitted because they do not contribute
additional insights.
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4.1. Land and Monarchy: [0, tk]. In the beginning of the model economy, agriculture is
the dominant production method. The productivity is so low that no saving is available for
capital accumulation, and thus capitalists are not distinguishable from the worker group.29 The
initial political regime is monarchy where a dominant landowner with land Lm is the ruler, who
imposes tax τ on landowners and workers. A landlord i owns land Li and employs Nti workers
taking wage wt as given,30 where
∑Nl
i=1 Li = L and
∑Nl
i=1 Nti = N + Nc.
LEMMA 1. The optimal profit for a landlord i with land Li is Iti = λAtLi, where λ ≡
(1 − α)(N+NcL )α. The monarch’s total income Itm = λAt[(1 − ητ)Lm + ητ1−αL] includes his land
profit and tax revenues from other landlords and workers.
Because the coercive power of landowners is proportional to land size, the fixed amount of
land implies that no landlords are able to challenge monarchy as long as the monarch owns
large enough land.
PROPOSITION 2. When land is the main source of wealth, monarchy continues without any
revolt as long as Lm ≥ ω1L, where ω1 ≡ 1+ηα/(1−α)1−η+ω0/ψ(Nl−1,e) .
This proposition suggests that the overwhelming power of themonarch, which is derived from
his dominant land size Lm, enables him to enforce a stable political order without challenge
from others. Because the monarch is the richest person and his income Itm increases over time,
a society starts to have positive bequests when Itm reaches the threshold income Z in period tk,
which is uniquely determined by
Itk,m = A0λ
[
(1 − ητ)Lm + ητ1 − αL
]
(1 + g)tk = Z.(4)
It is obvious that tk arrives earlier when Lm, L, and ητ are larger. As the large inequality of land
ownership under monarchy shortens the time for society to begin capital investment, monarchy
facilitates economic development when land is the main source of wealth.
4.2. Physical Capital and Oligarchy: (tk, Tk]. With surpluses available in society after tk,
capitalists start to use their special skills to produce physical capital.31 The endogenous supply
of physical capital marks its fundamental difference from land. Such a change in the economic
arena will induce corresponding adjustment in the political system.
To be consistent with historical evidence, we focus on the case where public education
for workers is not provided under monarchy, which happens when γ is sufficiently small (see
Proposition 4). The total physical capital stock is thusKt =Bt−1 in any period t under monarchy.
Individual landowners choose the optimal demand for capital and labor to maximize their
profits, taking as given the capital rental rate r∗t and wage w
∗
t , which clear the capital and
labor markets in equilibrium. Capitalists also have to pay τ proportion of their income to the
monarch.32
The ever increasing stock of physical capital induces faster growth in total output than before.
The monarch benefits from capital accumulation through increased tax revenues and capital
returns. Economic development, however, would gradually build up pressure to challenge the
29 The assumption that capitalists do not emerge from landowners is consistent with historical evidence, although it
has no effect on the qualitative results. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), for example, show that the crucial characteristics
of capitalists, such as patience and work ethic, were initially cultivated in certain working families but not in the landed
class.
30 Though receiving the market wage wt , workers still have to pay an exploitative tax τ that makes it essentially
equivalent to receiving a forced wage (1 − τ)wt .
31 The results are similar if the occupational choices of capitalists are endogenous; see the working paper version for
more details.
32 An endogenous tax rate on capitalists is considered in the working paper version.
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monarch’s absolute power because the joint income of the elites (capitalists and landowners)
grows faster than that of the monarch and so does their coercive power. When the burgeoning
capitalists join force together with landowners in their fight against the monarch, the political
transition may arrive faster than it would if they had acted alone; this is indeed true when Nl is
small or when L/Lm is large enough.33
PROPOSITION 3. After tk, the elites’ relative coercive power xt = ϕ(L+KtLm − 1) goes up over time
because Kt keeps increasing. In the political game between monarch and the elites, monarchy
continues with no revolt before Tk, where Tk is determined by
KTk = ω2Lm − L(5)
with ω2 ≡ 1−η+ω0/ϕ1+ηα/(1−α) . Revolt occurs at t ≥ Tk, which leads to compromise and a smooth transition
to oligarchy when θ ≥ θ∗tk holds, where
θ∗tk ≡
1 − τ
1 − ητ(χ/ϕ − α)/(1 − α) ,
and otherwise to an open fight that may result in either repression or revolution, where revolution
(a violent transition to oligarchy) is more likely to happen as time goes by due to xt increasing.
This proposition makes it clear that the driving force of the increasing coercive power of the
elites is the ever increasing physical capitalKt, andwhen it becomes large enough atTk, the elites
are capable of challenging the monarch. Note that ϕ ≡ ψ(Nc + Nl − 1, e) is the coordination
effectiveness of the elites, and when it is higher, the threshold KTk is smaller. Condition (5)
also shows that when Lm is bigger, the political transition time Tk is reached later, although
physical capital accumulation begins earlier (as tk in (4) is smaller). It implies that an economy
with higher inequality in the initial land distribution will start to accumulate physical capital
earlier, but its political transition to oligarchy may be relatively late because the monarch is too
powerful. Such a reversal of fortune is not uncommon in history.
This proposition suggests that the smooth transition of political regime from monarchy to
oligarchy tends to take place when the fighting cost is larger than the threshold θ∗tk; in this case,
it is not worthwhile for either group to resort to violent means, and thus mutually beneficial
compromise is reached. The following analysis assumes that this smooth transition is achieved
at Tk so that landlords and capitalists share political power and impose no tax on themselves
from period Tk onwards; discussions of other outcomes are collected in Section 4.5.
4.3. Human Capital and Democracy: (Tk, Th]. During the initial periods under the elite
rule, workers are still raw labor, and their after-tax wages are not high enough to have bequests.
The elites, however, may find it beneficial to start investing in human capital through public
education in some period when the physical capital stock becomes so large that the return of
investing more in it is relatively low. The following proposition provides the specific condition
under which human capital is not invested under monarchy and characterizes the first period th
that human capital investment starts and the optimal tax rate τh∗t for public education.
33 The coalition between capitalists and landowners seems more likely to happen than the co-optation alternative in
which the monarch divides the elites by co-opting either landowners or capitalists (Bertocchi and Spagat, 2001). When
compromise would have been reached in the political game analyzed here, the co-optation payment to landowners
or capitalists must be at least as large as their tax payment to the monarch; otherwise they should reject it and ally
with each other. It must, however, be smaller than the joint tax revenue paid by both groups, otherwise the monarch
would not benefit from co-optation. But then the group that is not co-opted can bribe the other group by offering a
transfer up to their tax payment. Thus co-optation of one group is, at least weakly, dominated by the coalition between
capitalists and landowners in the compromise case. Co-optation may delay the open fight but cannot prevent it because
the relative coercive power of the elites is increasing over time.
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PROPOSITION 4. Human capital investment does not start under monarchy if γ < N(ξ−α)
αω2Lm
,where





In any period t ≥ th, the optimal tax rate τh∗t for public education is determined by
α(L+ K∗t )h∗′t − (1 − α)Nh∗t = 0,(7)
where K∗t = (1 − τh∗t )Bt−1 and h∗t = f (τh∗t Bt−1/N). The public education expenditure Mh∗t =
τh∗t Bt−1 is strictly increasing in Bt−1.
This proposition suggests that the tax rate for public education τh∗t is optimally chosen by the
ruling elites to balance the marginal returns of investing in physical and human capital. Human
capital investment starts later when the number of workers N is larger and when the return
of initial investment γ is smaller. After th, public education begins, and its expenditure keeps
increasing over time, which drives up the human capital level for workers and their coordination
effectiveness. As a result, the collective coercive power of workers will eventually reach the
threshold in some period and trigger a change of equilibrium outcome in the political game.
PROPOSITION 5. After th, the relative coercive power of workers xt = αψ(N,ht)(1−α)ψ(Nc+Nl,e) goes up
over time because ht is increasing. In the political game between elites and workers, oligarchy
continues with no revolt before Th, which is uniquely determined by
ψ(N,hTh) = ω3ψ(Nc + Nl, e),(8)
where ω3 ≡ ω0
(
1 + ηα1−α
)−1. Revolt occurs at t ≥ Th, which leads to compromise and full democ-
racy when θ ≥ θ∗th holds, where
θ∗th =
1 − τ
1 − α(1−α)xt ητχ
and ∂θ∗th/∂xt < 0, otherwise to an open fight that may result in either repression or revolution,
where revolution (a violent transition to the rule of workers) is more likely to happen as time goes
by due to xt increasing.
Similar to the transition frommonarchy to oligarchy, mutual compromise is reached between
the elites and workers when it is too costly to fight; in this case, the elites extend political power
to workers in a smooth transition of political regime from oligarchy to full democracy, where
no tax is imposed on wages, and as a result each factor earns its competitive return and the
exploitative tax disappears. It turns out that under democracy the optimal tax rate τh∗t for public
education is also determined by Equation (7), because the elites’ joint income under oligarchy
is proportional to the aggregate income.
4.4. TheSmoothDevelopmentPath: Summary. Thedevelopment path in themodel is driven
by the technical features of different production factors and political conflicts among factor
owners in dividing the outputs, although the effects of many elements (such as geography,
culture, religion, ideologies, wars, and colonization) that bestow much richness to the actual
history are mainly reflected by differences in parameters related to tax collecting (η, τ), cost of
fighting (θ), repressing capacity χ, and the effectiveness of groups in transforming incomes to
coercive power (ψ(Nj, et)). If at both transition timesTk andTh the cost of fighting is higher than
the corresponding threshold, a smooth economic and political development path as illustrated
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FIGURE 3
THE TIME LINE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 1
THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT PATH
The Political Transition
Time t ≤ Tk t ∈ [Tk, Th] t > Th
Political regime Monarchy Oligarchy Democracy
The ruler Dominant landowner Landowners and capitalists All factor owners
Exploitative tax τ τ on workers, 0 on others 0
Education tax 0 0 in t ≤ th, τh∗t > 0 after th τh∗t > 0
The Economic Growth
Time t ≤ tk [tk,Tk] [Tk, th] [th,Th] t > Th
Physical capital Kt 0 BMKt−1 B
OK
t−1 (1 − τh∗t )BOHt−1 (1 − τh∗t )BDHt−1

















NOTE: tk, th, Tk,Th, and τh∗t are determined by (4), (6), (5), (8), and (7), respectively.
in Figure 3 is to be taken, where the political regime adjusts smoothly to the evolving factor
composition of land, physical capital, and human capital; England seems to be such a case,
where political compromises were reached at these crucial moments. This type of coevolution
path is summarized by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 6. Compromise between the incumbent ruler and the challenging group is
reached at both transition times Tk and Th when it is too costly to fight (θ ≥ max{θ∗tk, θ∗th}),
and the political economy evolves as follows. Physical capital accumulation starts at period tk and
human capital investment starts at th. Monarchy continues before Tk, after which it is replaced by
oligarchy of landowners and capitalists, and finally, after Th, workers also gain political rights,
and hence full suffrage is realized. The endogenous time path tk < Tk < th < Th suggests that
economic development leads to political transition, which in turn facilitates future economic de-
velopment. The evolution of the total output {Yt}+∞t=1 is characterized by the increasing amount
of total saving {Bt−1}+∞t=1 in the economy, where BMKt−1 < BOKt−1 < BOHt−1 < BDHt−1 in Table 1 holds and
thus the economic growth rate keeps increasing due to knowledge accumulation, new capital
investment, and expansion of political right.
As shown in Table 1, the exploitative tax τ is imposed on all three production factors under
monarchy because only the dominant landowner, the monarch, has political power. This tax is
waived for both land and physical capital under oligarchy, and finallywaived forworkers’ human
capital under full democracy. Such sequential elimination of exploitative tax is driven by the
corresponding change of coercive power of factor owners and made permanent by the gradual
extension of political power; it reduces the waste of resources associated with tax collecting and
thus increases incentives for more capital investment.
The efficiency gain is reflected in Figure 4 by the ever increasing economic growth rate along
the path. Before tk, the economy grows at an exogenous rate g that may be close to zero as is
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FIGURE 4
THE EVOLUTION OF DETRENDED OUTPUT ON THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT PATH
routine in the Malthusian era, which is represented by the first point in the graph at ytk . Once
investment in physical capital starts, however, the economic growth rate (L+Kt+1)
1−α
(L+Kt)1−α g becomes
higher due to increasing capital accumulation. The political transition from monarchy to oli-
garchy at Tk further increases the growth rate because the total amount of capital investment
increases from BMKt−1 under monarchy to a higher level B
OK
t−1 under oligarchy due to reduced
tax-collecting cost. Starting from th, human capital investment pushes up the growth rate to
(L+Kt+1)1−αHαt+1
(L+Kt)1−αHαt g, which is then increased further by the larger total capital investment B
DH
t−1 under
democracy after Th. As a result, the final steady-state output y* is much higher than those that
would have been achieved in any old economic and political regimes.
4.5. Development PathswithRepression orRevolution. The smooth development path char-
acterized above serves as the benchmark case to be compared with various deviations. When
the fighting cost is low during the political transition period (that is, if θ < θ∗tk at Tk or θ < θ
∗
th
at Th), the SPE outcome can be either repression or revolution. If repression occurs, the old
political regime continues, and then the same political game is played in each following period
t. Though this situation may continue for a long time, its probability gradually decreases as
time goes on (due to q′(xt) < 0 and xt increasing), and sooner or later, either compromise or
revolution will occur so that a transition to a new political regime is achieved.
When revolution happens in the transition process from monarchy to oligarchy, the result
differs little from the compromise case because in both cases the political power is shared among
landowners and capitalists, although only one landowner’s treatment (namely, the monarch) is
different. When it happens under elite rule, workers become the new ruler and impose tax τ on
land and physical capital, which will last forever in this specific model context unless stochastic
shocks are allowed to affect coercive capacities of different groups—if this happens, then the
political regimemay revert back to oligarchy, and then the same political game is to be repeated.
In both cases of repression and revolution, economic development lags behind that of the
benchmark case because resources are wasted in tax collection and fighting. Although different
in the specific timing, the sequence of the developmental stages is the same in all scenarios:
Land endowment precedes physical capital investment, which in turn precedes human capital
investment, and the correspondencebetween landpredominance andmonarchy, physical capital
predominance and oligarchy, and finally, human capital predominance and democracy (or
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majority rule) is maintained. In other words, the dynamic compatibility between the economic
and political development illustrated in Figure 3, which is the main insight of this article, holds
for all scenarios.
5. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Roughly speaking, most Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries have experienced all the developmental stages in the model and are now
beyond Th, although their paths may not be as smooth as that in England. This section gathers
some historical evidence in Western Europe to convince the reader that the simple model ana-
lyzed above is consistent with broad historical facts and is useful in organizing our thoughts on
long-run economic and political development. Themain focus is the history of England, France,
and Germany, where the full time line suggested in the model has been realized, and political
compromise was reached in time to avoid prolonged economic stagnation. A systematic analysis
of other countries is best left for future research.
5.1. A Brief Overview. The key feature of economic development in the model, the main
source of wealth evolving from land to physical capital and finally to human capital, is an
almost indisputable fact. From the beginning of settled agriculture, the predominance of land
in production lasted thousands of years (Cipolla, 1976). Gradually, commercial and industrial
sectors replaced agriculture to become dominant economic activities, leading to the Industrial
Revolution in the last half of the eighteenth century (North, 1981). By the early twentieth
century, themodern concept of thewealth of nations had emerged: “It was that capital embodied
in the people—human capital—mattered” (Goldin, 2001).
The dynamic compatibility between the evolving composition of production factors in the
economy and the transition of political regimes, which is the main contribution of the arti-
cle, is also observed in history. After the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century up
to the year 1000, Europe was stagnant both in income and population. The introduction of
feudalism in the ninth century enabled Europe to gradually emerge from anarchy and develop
a political–economic structure that produced sufficient order and stability and led to a con-
comitant expansion of both population and economic activity (North, 1981). Feudal landlords
directed all their attention and efforts to the maintenance and expansion of their inherited
lands, which were the most important form of wealth and power (Blockmans, 1997). These are
consistent with Proposition 2.
As more surpluses from agriculture became available, towns started to grow in the tenth
century, in parallel with the formation and consolidation of kingdoms. Princes benefited from
this process by receiving extra revenues from the cities. As economic development strengthened
the business and profession classes, the citizenry struggled for autonomy and independence.
The development of parliamentary democracy was made easier in England by its relatively
weak repressive apparatus compared to continental monarchies and by the joint force of the
landowners and bourgeoisie (the upper stratum of town dwellers) against the monarch (Moore,
1966, p. 32). After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, “Parliament became more sympathetic and
accessible to the aspirations ofmerchants, masters andmanufacturers, farmers and landowners”
(O’Brien, 1994). The Industrial Revolution started first in England around the mid-eighteenth
century, and many years later spread to other countries. The industrialization process brought
forth fundamental economic and political transformations across Europe, especially after the
French Revolution. Although different in timing and format across countries, the propertied
class inWesternEurope had acquired substantial political powers during the nineteenth century
and transformed the traditional absolute monarchies into an essentially oligarchical rule of
landowners and capitalists, which corresponds to results in Proposition 3.
The Industrial Revolution created a largeworking class concentrated in urban neighborhoods
and workplaces, which enhanced the coordination efficiency among workers. In its second
phase, the demand for skilled workers was driven up, which induced massive education reforms
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(corresponding to Proposition 4) in many European countries during the latter half of the
nineteenth century (Galor and Moav, 2006). The rising human capital of workers and their
increasing ability to coordinate in collective actions eventually led to franchise expansion in
several European countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000). In the early twentieth century,
at the end of the First World War, the agrarian societies of peasants and craftsman in many
European countries had already been turned into industrialized societies of machine-tenders
and bookkeepers, and correspondingly, oligarchical rule was replaced eventually by democratic
institutions with full suffrage (as in Proposition 5).
5.2. England. The English development path seems to fit best into the benchmark case of
smooth development, where a national monarchy was established early to provide a stable and
peaceful environment, and political compromises were achieved in a relatively peaceful way and
timely enough to reflect the evolving composition of production factors in the economy and the
corresponding change of power balance among factor owners. The economic development was
thus greatly facilitated in England, which became the first nation to start the industrialization
and democratization process that has fundamentally transformed the world.
The experience of England can be stated more explicitly in the terms of the model: The
early establishment of a stable monarchy in 1066 facilitated economic development (which is
consistent with the implications of Proposition 2). The growth of commerce and the joint force
of landowners and capitalists (upper stratum town dwellers) forced the monarch to make a
political compromise with the parliament in 1688, which marks the transition from monarchy
to oligarchy, and the new political regime greatly promoted commercial and industrial interests
(Proposition 3). Human capital investment did not begin until the 1830s when the physical
capital stock was large enough in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution (Proposition
4), and it eventually led to full suffrage where workers were granted political power in 1918
(Proposition 5).
England has been an unified state since 1066 when William the Conqueror invaded Anglo-
Saxon England and became its monarch. The monarch’s power was based upon the economy
of the crown lands, especially that of its concentrated location and productive capacity. In the
following five hundred years, the essential integrity of the monarchy was not compromised,
although there were some royal concessions by minorities and weak kings to the magnates
(Roberts, 2004, p. 506). Agricultural productivity began to increase under the stable political
order, and the rise in food production enabled towns to develop steadily.
The growth of commerce in the towns during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had
created a market for agricultural products in the English countryside, thereby setting in motion
a process leading toward commercial and capitalist agriculture in the countryside itself. The
joint force of the landowners and the upper stratum of town dwellers was an important cause
of the Civil War and the ultimate victory of the parliamentary enterprise. Another important
element in the success of parliament over the monarch is the latter’s lack of strong repressive
apparatus, such as an effective bureaucracy and a strong army. This may possibly be due to
the previous evolution of the monarchy and the reliance on the navy rather than on the army
(Moore, 1966, p. 32).
TheGloriousRevolution in 1688marked the fundamental political transition inEngland from
monarchy to the parliamentary rule of landowners and bourgeois, although the crown still kept
considerable political power within the parliament. From then on, England was governed by
oligarchies representing the effective possessors of social and economic power, who constantly
took care “to defend the commercial interests of the country and accepted the leadership and
guidance in this of the collective wisdom of the City of London” (Roberts, 2004, p. 566). As a
consequence, commercial and industrial interests were well reflected in governmental policies,
and economic development was greatly facilitated in eighteenth-century England (North and
Weingast, 1989).
Inside the framework provided by prosperity and English political institutions, technical
progress was continuous. By 1750 the most advanced techniques were practiced, and the
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integration of agriculture with a commercial market economy had progressed furthest in
England. The profits were then invested in capital to further improve productivity. An
expanding overseas commerce generated further profits for investment, and the growing
financial institutions enhanced the process. Thus, it is no coincidence that the Industrial
Revolution began first in England in the middle of the eighteenth century, and it fundamentally
transformed a primarily agrarian society to a mature industrial society within a century.34
The value of human capital in production was still limited in the first phase of the Industrial
Revolution, when workers developed skills primarily through on-the-job training, and child
labor was highly valuable. Under Elizabethan and Stuart statutes that remained unreformed
between 1688 and 1815, the state retained considerable power in determining wages and condi-
tions of employment; such statutes and the common law strengthened the authority of employers
and depressed wages (O’Brien, 1994). Not surprisingly, workers still received very low wages,
and their living standards showed no clear improvement before 1820 (Lindert, 1994).
Fairly soon, however, employers realized that they needed more than just a labor force
that was available, because the contribution of workers to superior economic performance is
dependent upon both their skills and attitudes. The increasing importance of human capital in
the second phase of the Industrial Revolution prompted a sequence of education reforms in
England from the 1830s, which were designed primarily to satisfy increasing skill requirements
(Galor and Moav, 2006). Realizing that workers would only expend high levels of effort in
the production process if they expected to receive a “fair share” of the consequent returns,
employers became receptive to sharing power with workers’ organizations rather than fighting
unionization. The employers’ acceptance of collective bargaining, in turn, opened the way for
political transformation. “One result was the 1867 extension of the right to vote to the better-
paid of the workers” (Lazonick, 1994). Full suffrage was finally realized in Britain in 1918 for
men and in 1928 including women.
5.3. France. The French experience is less smooth and clear-cut than that of England. The
national monarchy was established in France much later than in England, and its commerce and
manufacturing also lagged behind. Its political transition from absolute monarchy to oligarchy
was accomplished by violent upheavals and revolutions (starting from 1789), although the
subsequent transition to democracy with full suffrage was delivered by the military defeat of
war (in 1871). The state’s high-repressive capacity seems to be the main reason behind its
difference from England. This was probably due to the necessity of a strong army to establish a
central monarchy in the first place, and to survive the conflicts with other Continental European
states. It seems likely that the repression and economic stagnationmight have remained longer in
France if it had been left alone without competition from the advanced economy of neighboring
England. Fortunately, the revolutions broke the grip of the old regime early enough for France
to catch up with the industrialization and democratization process ahead of many other nations.
The French kingdom was initially very decentralized. In the middle of the fifteenth century,
France gradually evolved from a feudal country to an increasingly centralized state organized
around a powerful absolutemonarchy. The growth of the Frenchmonarchy had largely deprived
the landed upper classes of political responsibility and diverted much of the bourgeois impulse
to its own purposes. The practice of selling positions in the bureaucracy, for example, by
converting the bourgeoisie into an aristocracy, diminished the bourgeois drive toward property
and political independence. Commerce and manufacturing in France thus lagged behind that
of England (Moore, 1966).
However, the ancient regime, which diverted energy and resources from commerce and
industry and hence was repressive in terms of economic development, was already under severe
strain and soon to be mortally wounded in 1789 by the French Revolution. “Hitherto, political
34 Note that the growth of commercial and industrial sectors preceded the political transition to parliamentary rule in
1688, which in turn led to further economic growth as exemplified by the Industrial Revolution. Such timing is consistent
with the model predictions.
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power had been virtually a noble monopoly. Between 1789 and 1799, however, France was
governed and reformed by overwhelmingly bourgeois assemblies, largely elected by bourgeois
voters. No subsequent regime was ever able substantially to reverse these advances” (Doyle,
1992, p. 376). The ultimate outcome of all the forces at work was a victory for an economic
system of private property and a political system based upon equality before the law, the
essential features in Western parliamentary democracies. Although not a bourgeois revolution
in the restricted sense of the seizure of political power by a bourgeoisie that already had won the
commanding heights of economic power, historians generally agree that the French Revolution
was a triumph for the bourgeoisie (Moore, 1966).
The right to vote in Francewas still severely restricted under the restoredBourbons from 1815
to 1830; the electorate included only the largest property owners. After the July Revolution of
1830, the number of voters doubled; at this point the old aristocracy disappeared as a coherent
and effective political group. Then the French industrial revolution started, a century later than
in Britain. Although universal suffrage for all adult male citizens was introduced as a result of
the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, it did not function normally in the Second Empire from
1852 to 1870. Throughout this period industrial expansion continued, which strengthened the
economic and political power of the working classes. The old regime collapsed upon defeat in
the 1871 war, indicating the start of a lasting democracy entailing universal male suffrage.
5.4. Germany. Germany as a modern nation state was unified only in 1871 when the Ger-
man Empire was forged with the kingdom of Prussia as its largest constituent. The long-term
fragmentation among German states contributed to their late industrialization compared with
England and France, and as a result the democratization process was interwoven with nation
building in a complicated manner that shaped its distinct conservative modernization path led
by authoritarian governments. Stable democracy was finally realized only after the authoritar-
ian state’s strong repression capacity was destroyed by major military defeats.35 The German
experience illustrates that, the later that a country develops, the more complex its developmen-
tal path is, as it is likely to be greatly affected by other advanced countries. Nonetheless, the
dynamic coevolution between economic and political development can still be clearly seen, and
the broad historical trend illustrated in Figure 3 is also evident.
By the middle of the fourteenth century, Prussia still resembled Western Europe where
peasants were prosperous and relatively free. Toward the end of this century, however, certain
changes began that later led to enserfment of the peasants. One of the most important changes
was the introduction of grain exports. In the following two centuries, the German Junkers
established a labor repressive system in order to grow grain for export, and at the same time
reduced the towns to dependence by short-circuiting themwith their exports. In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries the result was a militarized fusion of royal bureaucracy and landed
aristocracy.36 The ruler’s strong repressing capacity was perhaps the main reason why a labor
repressive agrarian system was adopted in Germany, which seemed to be consistent with the
observation that the resistance to such a system from peasants and towns was limited and easily
suppressed.
Early in the nineteenth century, when the industrialization started to gather momentum, a
strong movement of liberal and democratic opposition began forming in the German states.
It culminated in the Revolution of 1848 but was quickly suppressed. A fundamental reason
is that the commercial and industrial class was still too weak and dependent to take political
power, in part due to its need for authoritarian state support to unify the national market and
compete with the advanced industrial economies. The 1848 revolution also failed because it
attempted to create democratization and national unification simultaneously. Nonetheless, it
35 In this regard the experiences of Italy and Japan were similar.
36 England, in contrast, developed agricultural commercialization without tying peasants to the land and hence
facilitated the development of town life. “Much of the subsequent history of the two countries goes back to this homely
difference” (Moore, 1966, p. 460).
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helped pave the way for the eventual achievement of its goals in a sequential matter. In 1849,
the Prussian three-class franchise system that greatly favored the wealthy class was introduced,
and was carried over to the unified Germany until the Weimar Republic was formed in 1918.
The coalition of “Iron and Rye” was formed in the 1850s “combining authoritarianism with
bourgeois elements, against the menace of peasant and proletariat” (Trebilcock, 1981). This
alliance between the landed class and the rising industrial class created a climatemore favorable
to industrial advancement. The unification of Germany was finally achieved in 1871, when the
Prussian army destroyed the last monarchical regime in France and created theGermanEmpire
or the Second Reich, a constitutional monarchy with a parliament of very limited power.
Germany’s industrial proletariat had increased in size as the result of intensive industrial-
ization since the 1850s, and workers started to organize a socialist party and trade unions in
1869. Feeling threatened by a potentially revolutionary force, the state issued repressive laws
against socialist organizations, although at the same time extending suffrage and establishing a
social welfare system to win over the poor masses. Full democracy, however, was to be achieved
mainly as the consequence of military defeats. In 1918, at the end of World War I, the Weimar
constitution came into effect, which transformed the German Empire into a democratic re-
public, albeit a fragile one. The establishment of a stable liberal parliamentary republic had to
wait until after World War II in West Germany, and in East Germany until the reunification
in 1990. “Without the defeat, it seems quite likely that Germany would not have become a
democracy for decades, until something created a decisive shift in the balance of class forces”
(Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p. 109).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article establishes a simple model in which the coevolution of economic and political
development is driven by the inherent technical features of different production factors and the
political conflicts among factor owners in output distribution. The dynamic economic progress
transforms the main source of wealth from land to physical capital and then to human capital;
enables their respective owners, landlords, capitalists, and workers to gain political power in
the same sequence and consequently shifts the political regime from monarchy to oligarchy of
landowners and capitalists and then to democracy with full suffrage.When it is too costly for any
group of factor owners to repress others, political compromise is reached during the transition
periods so that economic progress is not interrupted; otherwise, political conflicts may lead to
repression of some factor owners and economic stagnation.
A main insight to emerge from this article is the dynamic compatibility of economic and
political development. On one hand, it brings a developmental perspective into the discussions
of appropriate or growth-enhancing political institutions. For instance, the article suggests that
when natural resources are the main form of wealth, monarchy or other authoritarian regimes
are probably the political equilibrium that naturally arises; only when human capital becomes
predominant in the economy, which often happens after a society has a large enough physical
capital stock, would a political democracy be more likely to sustain itself. On the other hand,
it highlights the importance of a society’s capacity for smooth political transitions in facilitating
economic development. For example, the willingness and ability to make political compromise
may have greatly facilitated economic progress in the history of England, which had that “most
elusive yet decisive institutional feature that makes for economic success: the flexibility to adapt
its economic and legal institutions without political violence and disruptions” (Mokyr, 2005). In
societies where institutions are rigid and difficult to change from within, economic stagnation
often prevails, and ultimate changes may be forced upon them by costly domestic violence or
outside threats.
The article’s analytical framework may prove useful in understanding related long-run de-
velopment issues. For instance, it can be readily extended to study the effects of international
forces, such as war, colonization, and globalization, on the development process either of an
individual country or at different historical times, although taking into consideration that the
DEVELOPMENT FROM MONARCHY TO DEMOCRACY 1361
changing motivation, format, and frequency of these international activities may also reflect the
shifts of factor composition in production. This may generate new insights into the relationship
between democracy and war: If democratic countries have human capital as the dominant form
of wealth, which is often true, it is not surprising that they seldom wage wars against each other.
What is the point of conquering a nation whose main wealth is human capital? The relevant
parties could have been better off by engaging each other in peaceful international trade. The
model can also be extended by endogenizing the state’s repression capacity and costs. For exam-
ple, the virtually perfect correlation between country size and landlord strength is no accident,
because only strong landlords had the coercive power to conquer more lands and establish
large monarchies; this may help explain the distinct developmental paths of small countries.
The evolution of education system, in terms of both contents and financing methods, may also
be shaped by similar driving forces as in the model, including the evolving factor composition
and the changing power balance among factor owners.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. At the last node, the challenging group gets (1 − τ)ICt if they
refrain from revolting, and an expected income q
CtR + (1 − q)
CtV if they carry out the revolt,
because with probability q the revolt is repressed and the group gets an income 
CtR = (1 −
τ)ICt /θ, whereas with probability 1 − q the revolt is successful and the group gets an income

CtV = ICt + ητIGt + ητIOt . So Not Revolt is chosen if
(1 − τ)ICt /θ ≥ q
CtR + (1 − q)
CtV(A.1)
holds. After some algebra this leads to xt ≤ x∗t (θ), where
x∗t (θ) ≡ ω0 − η
(





with ω0 = (1/τ − 1)(1 − 1/θ)χ, and x∗′t (θ) > 0 is easily obtained.
At the second node, when xt ≤ x∗t (θ) holds, given that the challenging groupwill stop revolting
at the last node, the ruler’s payoff is 
Gt = IGt + ητICt + ητIOt if choosing Repress, and 
GtP =
IGt + ητIOt I
G
t
ICt +IGt if choosing Compromise. So the best choice is Repress. When xt > x
∗
t (θ) holds
instead, given that the challenging group will still revolt, choosing Repress brings two possible
outcomes to the ruler: It wins the fight with probability q and then gets an income 
GtR =

Gt , whereas if it loses, revolution occurs and it gets (1 − τ)IGt /θ. So the expected income of
the incumbent ruler choosing to repress is q
Gt + (1 − q)(1 − τ)IGt /θ. If the ruler chooses to
compromise instead, its income is 
GtP. So Repress is the optimal choice when
q




holds. After some algebra this leads to θ < θ∗t (η, τ, χ), where
θ∗t (η, τ, χ) =
1 − τ
1 − ητ − ητ(χψGt /ψCt − 1)/(1 − IOt /Yt)
.
So Repress is more likely to be chosen when θ∗t (η, τ, χ) is higher, which is true when ητ and
χ are higher. That is, the ruler’s best strategy is Repress if θ < θ∗t (η, τ, χ), and Compromise if
otherwise.
At the first node, when xt ≤ x∗t (θ), given that the ruler will repress, it is best for the challenging
group to choose Not Revolt, whereas when xt > x∗t (θ), it is best to choose Revolt, which will
leads to compromise if θ ≥ θ∗t (η, τ, χ), otherwise to Repress and conflict.
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If θ ≥ θ∗t (η, τ, χ) holds, given the ruler’s optimal choice of compromise, the challenging group
will choose to compromise instead of revolt if
q
CtR + (1 − q)
CtV ≤ ICt + ητIOt
ICt
ICt + IGt
holds, which is indeed true given θ ≥ θ∗t (η, τ, χ). 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1. The landlord’s profit maximization problem is
maxNti At(Li)
1−αNαti − wtNti, taking the wage rate wt as given. The first-order condi-
tion (FOC) αAt(Li)1−αNα−1ti = wt leads to the optimal labor demand N∗ti = ( αwt At)
1
1−αLi.




ti = N + Nc must hold, which yields the equilib-
rium wage rate w∗t = αAt( LN+Nc )1−α. Then we get N∗ti =
(N+Nc)Li
L and the optimal profit is
I∗ti = (1 − α)(N+NcL )αAtLi ≡ λAtLi. The size of a landlord’s land Li satisfies Li > LN+Nc α1−α , which
guarantees that a landlord’s profit is higher than worker wage w∗t . The monarch’s total income
at any period t ∈ [0, tk] is
Imt = λAtLm + ητλAt
[




(1 − ητ)Lm + ητ1 − αL
]
,
which includes his land profit and tax revenues from other landlords and workers. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2. The Nl − 1 landlords constitute the challenging group.
Their coercive power is vCt = ψCt ICt = ψ(Nl − 1, e)λAt(L− LM), the monarch’s coercive power
is vGt = ψGt IGt = ψ(N, 1)λAtLM = λAtLM given that ψ(1, e) = 1, and the joint before-tax in-
come of the neutral group (workers) is IOt = λAt α1−αL. According to Proposition 1, in the
equilibrium landlords will not challenge the monarch if xt ≤ x∗t (θ) holds, where xt = vCt /vGt =
ψ(Nl − 1, e)(L− LM)/LM does not change over time, and
x∗t (θ) = ω0 − η
(





= ω0 − ηψ(Nl − 1, e)(1 + αL/(1 − α)LM)
is also constant. Then xt ≤ x∗t (θ) boils down to LM ≥ ω1L, where
ω1 ≡ 1 + ηα/(1 − α)1 − η + ω0/ψ(Nl − 1, e) .
So as long as LM ≥ ω1L, the relative coercive power of land owners is not higher than the
threshold x∗t (θ) to challenge the monarch. Note that if after-tax incomes are used instead to
calculate coercive powers, the result is the same qualitatively. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3. Landlord i’s objective function is π∗ti = maxNti,kti At(Li +
kti)1−αNαti − wtNti − rtkti. The optimal demands for labor and physical capital are determined by
wt = αAt(Li + k∗ti)1−α(N∗ti)α−1,
rt = (1 − α)At(Li + k∗ti)−α(N∗ti)α.
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and N∗ti = NLi+k
∗
ti
L+Kt . Plugging N
∗
ti into the condition of rt we get






and k∗ti = LiL Kt clears the physical capital market.
A landlord’s profitπ∗ti is proportional to his land sizeLi:π
∗
ti = (1 − α)At( NL+Kt )αLi. A landlord’s
income is thus Itl = π∗ti. The joint income of capitalists is Itc = r∗t Kt, whereas that of workers is
w∗t N
∗






[(1 − α)(Lm + ητ(L− Lm)) + (1 − α)ητKt + αητ(L+ Kt)]
= r∗t
[
(1 − ητ)Lm + ητ1 − α (L+ Kt)
]
,
which includes the monarch’s land profit plus tax revenues from other landlords, capitalists, and
workers.
The aggregate before-tax income of the elites (the capitalists and landlords)





(L− Lm + Kt)(A.3)
grows faster than the monarch’s, and so does their coercive power ϕICt compared with the




whereas the threshold is x∗t (θ) = ω0 − ηϕ(1 + IOt /IGt ), where IOt = αYt = αAt(L+ Kt)1−αNα.
Then xt = x∗t (θ) will be reached in a certain period denoted by Tk when KTk = ω2Lm − L
holds, where
ω2 = ω0/ϕ + 1 − η1 + ηα/(1 − α) .
Note that KTk > 0 is implied by LM ≥ ω1L in Proposition 2. As Kt is strictly increasing in time,
Tk is uniquely determined. Note that if after-tax incomes are used instead to calculate coercive
powers, the result is the same qualitatively.




1 − ητ − ητ(χψGt /ψCt − 1)/(1 − IOt /Yt)
= 1 − τ
1 − ητ(χ/ϕ − α)/(1 − α)
for any period t ≥ Tk given that ψGt = 1, ψCt = ϕ, and IOt /Yt = α. 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4. The objective function of the elites in period t is
max
τht
Ie,t ≡ (1 − α + αητ)At(L+ Kt)1−α(Nht)α,











α[L+ (1 − τh∗t )Bt−1]f ′
(
τh∗t Bt−1/N
)− (1 − α)f (τh∗t Bt−1/N)N = 0 if τh∗t > 0,(A.4)
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α(L+ Bt−1)γ − (1 − α)N ≤ 0 if τh∗t = 0,(A.5)
where f ′(0) = γ and f (0) = 1 are substituted in (A.5). It is obvious to see that the left-hand side
in (A.5) strictly increases in the total surplus Bt−1, and thus it would eventually arise to zero
at certain period th, after which human capital investment starts. th is thus defined by (A.5) at
equality.














−α(L+ (1 − τh∗t )Bt−1)f ′′/N + f ′
> 0.
When γ is too small, human capital investment will start after the elite rule replaces monarchy








[(1 − α)L̂+ ητKt],





−1, and thus ξ ≡ ξTk = [1 + (1 − α)(1/ητ − 1)/ω2]−1 given thatKTk = ω2Lm − L.
So human capital investment will not start under monarchy when the FOC holds strictly at Tk:
α(L+ KTk)γ − (ξTk − α)N < 0, which leads to γ < N(ξ−α)αω2Lm . 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5. The mechanism of the game is the same as in Proposition 1,
although the detailed incomes are IGt = (1 − α)Yt, ICt = αYt, and IOt = 0. The implicit assump-
tion is that the total bequest in society is not reduced by the transition of political regime, which
requires workers to have positive bequests at least from period Th. When this is not true, the
elites have more incentives to repress workers and hence may delay the transition, although the
main results still hold.
The relative coercive power of workers is xt = ψ(N,ht)αψ(Nc+Nl,e)(1−α) , whereas the threshold level is
x∗t (θ) = ω0 − ηψ(N,ht)/ψ(Nc + Nl, e).
Then xt ≤ x∗t (θ) boils down to ψ(N,ht) ≤ ω3ψ(Nc + Nl, e), where
ω3 ≡ ω0/[1 + ηα/(1 − α)].
SoTh is determined byψ(N,hTh) = ω3ψ(Nc + Nl, e). Revolt is chosenwhen θ < θ∗th holds, where
θ∗th =
1 − τ
1 − ητ − ητ(χψGt /ψCt − 1)/(1 − IOt /Yt)
= 1 − τ
1 − ητχψ(Nc + Nl, e)/ψ(N,ht) =
1 − τ
1 − ητχα[(1 − α)xt]−1 .
It is obvious to see that ∂θ∗th/∂xt < 0. Then at t = Th we get θ∗Th = 1−τ1−ητχ/ω3 . 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 6. The evolution of the total output {Yt}+∞t=1 is characterized by
the total bequest {Bt}+∞t=1 in the economy, which is affected by the political schemes and their
associated tax rates. In any period t ≤ tk there is no capital accumulation, and the total output
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grows at a constant rate g due to the exogenous increase of knowledge stock At; this implies
Yt+1 = At+1(L)1−α(N + Nc)α = Yt(1 + g) at t ≤ tk.
During (tk,Tk], the economy is productive enough to have savings to invest in physical capital
Kt+1 = BMKt , where
BMKt = btm + btl + btc ≡ Itm − Z+ (Nl − 1)max{Itl − Z, 0} + max{Itc − NcZ, 0}





the last line in the above expression measures the total saving BMKt when all landlords and
capitalists have positive bequests. Physical capital accumulation presents a new channel for
growth so that the economy grows faster than g. The total output at [tk, Tk] is
Yt+1 = At+1(L+ Kt+1)1−αNα = At+1(L+ BMKt )1−αNα ≡ t(BMKt ).
During (Tk, th], monarchy is replaced by oligarchy of landlords and capitalists, and the total
saving is higher than before due to less waste in tax collection. The total output is now
Yt+1 = At+1(L+ BOKt )1−αNα ≡ t(BOKt )
at (Tk, th], where the total saving is
BOKt = (1 − α + αητ)Yt − (Nl + Nc)Z.
It is easy to see that BOKt > B
MK
t holds, and hence t(B
OK
t ) > t(B
MK
t ) is true. It is straightfor-








at t ∈ (tk, th].
After th, a new channel of growth, namely, human capital accumulation, is open. The total
output is








where the total saving is
BOHt = (1 − α + αητ)Yt − (Nl + Nc)Z+ max{α(1 − τ)Yt − NZ, 0}.
Note that τh∗t = argmaxτht Yt+1, which implies ̂t(BOHt ) > t(BOKt ), that is, the total output is
higher with human capital investment than without. Note that yt+1 = Yt+1/At+1 is again strictly










at t > th.
After Th, the oligarchy of landlords and capitalists is replaced by democracy, where no
exploiting tax is imposed so that the total saving is higher than before due to less waste in tax
collection. The optimal tax rate τh∗t for public education again maximizes the total output as
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before. The total output is now








where the total saving is
BDHt = Yt − (Nl + Nc + N)Z = Atyt − (Nl + Nc + N)Z.





BDHt , due to political regime changing and investment in new capital forms.




























and in the limit it converges to the steady state y* = (L + Nck*)1−αNαh*. 
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